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**THE SALIENCE OF UTILITARIAN AND IDENTITY CRITERIA FOR
ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF EU DEMOCRACY**

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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to establish a baseline for how citizens evaluate the EU nearly a decade into the economic and transnational migration crisis. We will use a newly assembled Eurobarometer representation file (1993-2014) to examine whether mass publics have changed the basis upon which they evaluate the EU's performance. The primary question at hand is whether the current crisis is viewed by citizens mainly through the lens of economic issues, as much prior research would lead us to expect (Anderson 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton 2003) or whether the flares in nationalist cross-border skirmishes between, say German and Greek politicians, reflect a deeper nationalism that resonates with European publics when they evaluate the EU. Analyses of several Eurobarometer surveys offer support for the expectation that the influence of utilitarian considerations and, to an even greater extent, nationalism has increased since the start of the sovereign debt crisis.

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This paper aims to establish a baseline for how citizens evaluate the EU nearly a decade into the economic and transnational migration crisis. We will use a newly assembled Eurobarometer representation file (1993-2014) to examine whether mass publics have changed the basis upon which they evaluate the EU's performance. The primary question at hand is whether the current crisis is viewed by citizens mainly through the lens of economic issues, as much prior research would lead us to expect (Anderson 1998; Eichenberg and Dalton 2003) or whether the flares in nationalist cross-border skirmishes between, say German and Greek politicians, reflect a deeper nationalism that resonates with European publics when they evaluate the EU.

Given this overarching objective, we assess the relative merits of instrumental versus nationalist explanations for popular evaluations about the EU in late 2014. A focus on just the past few years, however, begs the question of standards: any pattern of relative predictive strength of economic and identity factors will immediately raise questions about whether their relevance has changed since the onset of the crisis. Therefore, this paper will also examine how the relative merits of instrumental and nationalist yardsticks *have changed over time* in the public mind. It stands to reason that economic perceptions matter nowadays; even that their importance has increased since the onset of the crisis. We would be hard pressed to predict otherwise. We may also surmise that nationalist sentiments have risen recently (Hooghe and Marks 2008), though one recent analysis suggests that they actually declined in the past few years (Fligstein and Polyakova 2016). But even if we diagnose a decline in levels of nationalism, it is another question whether these sentiments relate to the EU in ways that they did not

before the crisis unfolded. They may increasingly structure evaluations of the EU for those who hold strong nationalist orientations, for example.

Generally, then, we ask: do publics *increasingly* evaluate the EU on the basis of its economic performance? If so, evaluations of the EU, however negative, may be primarily driven by instrumental considerations that come and go in response to economic conditions. Or are those intuitions correct which suggest that nationalist sentiments increasingly drive EU evaluations, even if levels of nationalism appear to have been contained? While cross-sectional analyses are very important in showing which factor matters the most for any point in time, we need a longer historical baseline of whether instrumental or nationalist criteria underlie the recent decline of confidence in the EU (Roth Nowak-Lehmann, and Otter 2013; Armingeon and Ceka 2013).

We take as our baseline the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1993 for theoretical as well as data-related reasons. Theoretically, it stands to reasons that the onset of realizing political integration in Europe provides a useful marker to compare the attitudes of mass publics about the EU over time. Practically, as we will show below, our representation file contains few indicators before the 1993 Eurobarometers so that we rely on those that were conducted between 1993 and 2014.¹

Instrumental Considerations, National Identity and European integration.

There can be no doubt that the way the Euro's flawed architecture, along with the transnational migration issues, has revealed once again how divided the continent can be when

¹ We continually update the representation file and will make it publicly available as a beta version soon.

its supra-national framework is called upon to solve a pressing, transnational issue. The architecture of the Euro has been severely criticized for its enormous complexity of having multiple governments coordinate the fiscal and budgetary framework of one currency (Grouwe 2013). The failure to recognize that Europe's "regions" (i.e. countries) pursue diverging interests that often cannot be reconciled—austerity versus spending comes immediately to mind—has led to a near paralysis in the EU's ability to deal with the sovereign debt crisis. The recent transnational issue of refugees from a war-torn country, along with a tide of economic migrants from outside Europe and EU-applicant countries, further reinforce the need for supra-national solutions that involve complex supranational mechanisms.

Given the EU's apparent limitations to provide a functional institutional framework to solve these issues, support for the EU in various forms has dropped substantially since 2007 (Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Roth, Nowack-Lehmann, and Otter 2013). One detailed analysis shows, for instance, that most indicators show a precipitous decline of mass trust in the EU in most EU countries between 2007 and 2011, except for Scandinavian democracies (Armingeon and Ceka 2013, p. 96). The study also finds that economic perceptions and factors significantly shape mass attitudes towards the EU, thus suggesting an interpretation that emphasizes the instrumental-rational public: economic conditions deteriorated and therefore people lower their evaluations of the EU, either trust in various institutions or, as we show below, the performance of the "EU democracy".

Political parties have taken note of these developments, partially responding to the rise of anti-migrant and anti-EU sentiments as in case of the British UKIP, Hungarian Fidesz, and the French National Front; partially instigating these controversies. The rise of these parties has

especially put pressure on mainstream parties. These parties have found it difficult to respond to transnational issues, especially European integration, which tends to cross-cut socio-economic alliances between parties and voters, thereby providing incentives for mainstream parties to downplay or blur these issues (Meguid 2008; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016).

But their rise also suggests that the issues over integration and especially migration may not be exclusively driven by rational-economic considerations. Some Euro-skeptic elites, like UKIP in the UK, often stress the economic implications of cross-border migration. Others, however, fuse economic motives with identity-based arguments that connect national interests to fears over economic issues and migrants. The French National Front and Hungary's Jobbik are prime examples of this fusion. But new right-wing neo-populist parties, which are less overtly stooped in an ethnic-based appeal, also appeal to a sense of nationalism in a more subtle form; for example, through their party-labels (e.g., Alternative for Germany).

What the initial rise of EU skepticism and the success of EU skeptic parties suggest is the possibility that they invoke appeals not just to an economic-rational calculus among publics but also one that is based on nationalist identities. This seems so obvious nowadays that one forgets that this "truism" has not been established—to our knowledge, there is no longitudinal analysis that traces the development of identity and EU-skepticism over time, even though some analyses clearly show that national identity mattered even during the relatively tranquil pre-crisis years (McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2008). Additionally, these intuitions raise questions about the veracity of economic accounts even for the migration-crisis era: perhaps economic issues are primarily seen through a lens of nationalism given that the debt crisis

involves the transfer of resources across nations. Let us therefore consider how economic and national identity may shape evaluations of the EU.

Economic Factors. This well-established perspective suggests in various guises that economic factors drive public evaluations of the EU. The primary line of reasoning asserts that instrumental considerations – specifically, the financial costs and benefits of European integration – determine support for the EU. In essence, evaluations are based on the EU’s expected or actual effects on an individual’s or the country’s economic well-being. At the individual-level, the most likely EU supporters are those with the knowledge, experience and/or skill sets to take advantage of the economic opportunities created by the common market (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Duch and Taylor 1997, Gabel 1998, Hooghe, et al 2007). Moreover, individuals with significant capital assets or trade investments prefer the monetary stability and market opportunities created by European integration (Scheve 2000, Gabel 2001). At the country-level, public support for the EU varies along with both perceived and actual levels of economic growth, unemployment and inflation within each EU member state (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Gabel and Palmer 1995) as well as the extent of intra-EU trade and economic assistance from the EU institutions (Brinegar, et al 2004, Eichenberg and Dalton 2007).

How do economic concerns affect judgments about the EU over time? In more theoretical terms, how has the growing salience of economic issues affected the basis upon which people view a supra-national framework? To answer this question (and that of the role of identity; see below), we must consider how contextual factors shape the basis upon which individuals judge political objects. There are obviously a myriad of candidates, including the personal environment of respondents, the influence of the mass media, the stances of political

elites, and many more. A macro-salience argument bundles the influence of these factors on individuals by arguing that the importance of national issues—such as the economy, the environment, the quality of institutions, migration, etc.—direct people’s attention to one type of issue and away from others. The macro-salience perspective is based on the issue-framing research, which seeks to understand how the presentation of issues invokes different “considerations” (Druckman 2004). Even subtle changes in an issue’s presentation can shift the basis upon which people judge political objects. In an environment that stresses law-and-order, people are more likely to support restrictions on the freedoms of extremists; stress individual liberties in an otherwise identically-worded question and people are more likely to extend this freedom even to extremists. The macro-salience theory extends and applies this individual-level mechanism to understand how changes in “context”—predominantly national factors— influence the basis upon which a political stimulus is evaluated (Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010; Druckman and Parkin 2005).

The last several years offer an ideal period to investigate these questions. Over this period of time, the member states of the EU have experienced significant economic change. The sovereign debt crisis, spurred by the revelation that a number of EU member states were unable to maintain payments on their debt obligations, has depressed economic growth across Europe, prompted austerity programs that have slashed government spending on public programs and lead to sustained, record levels of unemployment in many European countries. While one might imagine even worse economic conditions, we suspect the recent changes may be enough to shift the criteria with which individuals assess the EU. The most obvious possibility is that the financial crisis has exacerbated economic insecurities and elevated the

importance of economic concerns for individuals as they develop positions on European integration. For these reasons, we hypothesize on the basis of the macro-salience argument:

H1: The salience of economic criteria for assessments of EU democracy has increased since the onset of the economic crisis.

National identity. A potential rival expectation, however, arises from the fact that the economic crisis did not just invoke instrumental concerns but also stimulated nationalist sentiments. Even before the transnational migration crisis unfolded, national stereotypes informed and shaped international controversies, as when German chancellor Merkel was portrayed as Hitler in the Greek media or Greek citizens are as described as lazy in the German boulevard press. And we know from prior research that an individual's political identity can exert a potent influence on her attitudes toward the EU. Many individuals develop strong affective connections with the political-territorial unit in which they reside, usually the unit recognized as the nation-state. The literature on national identity identifies two types of identification with the nation-state: civic and ethnic nationalism (Eisenstadt and Geisen 1995). Civic nationalism is the broader form, in which anyone may acquire legal status as a citizen of the nation-state and thereby claim to be a member of that community (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010). Ethnic nationalism arises from common ancestral, religious, linguistic, cultural or historical roots and generally entails that an individual be born into a community (Fligstein, et al 2012). These identity orientations often influence an individual's understanding of their political system (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004) and motivate stronger political engagement when individuals perceive a threat to national interests (Fowler and Kam 2007).

In the EU, an individual's identity orientations have been found to work both for and against popular support for the European integration. The EU's founders hoped that economic integration might bind together different national communities and eventually create a pan-European sense of identity, whether civic or ethnic in nature. That outcome does not appear to have materialized. The already small number of Europeans who identify with the EU has declined over the last decade, while the strength of national attachments has only increased during that same period (Polyakova and Fligstein 2012). What is more, the macro-salience argument would suggest that the changing economic environment may have had a noticeable effect on the salience of identity-based criteria. The tendency to identify with a specific territorial community often coincides with the demarcation of in-groups and out-groups; indeed, for some individuals, national identity is defined by who does and does not qualify as a member of the community (Brewer 1996). These affective orientations thus create the potential for inter-group conflict (Brewer 2001), which is often exacerbated in situations where perceived or actual competition exists over power or resources (Hardin 1995, Monroe, et al 2000). In most member states, both the financial crisis and the resulting austerity policies have stretched thin the resources available for public use. Additionally, the fact that the winners and losers of the economic malaise are easily connected to groups (i.e., nations) further raises the distinct possibility that the economic rescue packages stimulate not only a rise in economic concerns but also drive nationalist sentiments to the fore: Dutch and German citizens, for example, pay into the rescue pot; crisis countries benefit from it, so there is a simplistic and easy way to identify winners and losers on the basis of national identity. This seems to constitute a near-ideal context of group-conflict based on competition for scarce resources

(Sniderman and Haagendorn 2008). The ongoing migrant crisis, which dates back some years, may have further elevated perceived threats to the national well-being. Such an environment may serve to activate or energize an individual's nationalist orientation, particularly as they evaluate an entity (the EU) at the center of most of these developments.

H2: The salience of identity-related criteria for assessments of EU democracy has increased over time and, especially, since the advent of the European financial crisis.

Methods

To investigate these expectations, this paper relies on data from the Eurobarometer Representation Dataset (ERD). The European Commission began the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys in 1973, for the purpose of “monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of texts, decision-making and the evaluation of its work” (the Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European Union 2015). As part of this project, the Commission fields at least two ‘Standard Eurobarometer’ surveys each year, which includes a series of standardized questions on European integration, the EU institutions and EU policies. The ERD collects nearly 400 measures of political behavior at the European level from Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 1987 and 2014.

The Eurobarometer regularly asks respondents to rate their level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the European Union. Based on the response metric, we use the following scale in our analyses: (1) “not at all satisfied”, (2) “not very satisfied”, (3) “don’t know”, (4) “fairly satisfied”, and (5) “very satisfied”.² The Eurobarometer asks this question

² Much of the research on EU attitudes measures support for the EU with a question from the Eurobarometer surveys that asks respondents whether they think their country's membership in the EU is a good thing or a bad thing. This question has the advantage of appearing in most Eurobarometer surveys between 1972 and 2010 and

every year since 1993, with the exceptions of 1996 and 2008. Across those 20 years, the mean varies between 2.82 (SD=1.26) in 1998 to 3.23 (SD=1.18) in 2009. The EU tends to perform worse on this metric as time advances. Figure 1 illustrates the over-time patterns in satisfaction with EU democracy in each of the EU member states. In general, support has declined in Southern Europe in recent years; remained steady or declined in most East European countries; and remained steady or even increased in most of Western Europe. To account for the influence of economic perceptions, we construct both sociotropic and egotropic additive measures of expectations for economic performance over the next 12 months. The first measure includes expectations about the general economic situation and the employment situation in the respondent's country. The second measure includes expectations about the financial situation of the respondent's household and the respondent's personal job situation. Both measures are coded from (2) "worse" to (6) "better". We also control for the salience of economic issues using a Eurobarometer question asking respondents to identify the two most important problems (from a list of choices) facing their country today. Five of the possible responses suggest economic issues matter to an individual: taxation, pensions, unemployment, rising prices/inflation and the economic situation. We construct an additive measure that ranges from "0. No economic issues mentioned" to "2. Two economic issues mentioned".

thus permits scholars to track changes in support over time. There are, however, a number of disadvantages to this measure. First, the question focuses on support for the European project as a whole, rather than specific institutions or policies within the EU, and thus does not allow for much nuance in public opinion on questions about European integration. Unsurprisingly, the public exhibits little variation in expressed levels of support for and opposition to the EU over the period of time covered by the question. More specifically, the question does not allow us to investigate the central argument of the procedural approach: that individuals are unhappy with the EU's political processes and institutions (rather than the EU project as a whole). Finally, the Eurobarometer stopped asking this question in 2010. As such, this question does not allow us to compare public opinion before and after the European financial crisis.

The effects of identity-based concerns are accounted for with the Eurobarometer question asking each respondent how she sees herself in the future. The Eurobarometer includes the responses: “1. (NATIONALITY) only 2. (NATIONALITY) and European 3. European and (NATIONALITY) and 4. European only”. Because over 90% of respondents choose one of the first two responses, we collapse the last three responses into a single category (Hooghe and Marks 2008). The resulting dichotomous variable is either (1) “(NATIONALITY) only” or (2) some identification with Europe.

We measure political criteria for evaluating EU democracy with a standard Eurobarometer question asking each respondent to select, from a list of positive and negative prompts, the word that best indicates what the EU means to them personally. Two such items are that the EU is “wasteful” and “bureaucratic”, both of which would suggest that a respondent doubts the quality of procedural representation at the European level. Our analyses also include a number of demographic controls that have been found to influence political attitudes in past research, including age, gender, education, left/right ideology, frequency of political discussion and occupational status. Appendix A describes the construction of these control variables.

The macro-salience argument presumes that the political and economic context conditions public perceptions of the EU; more specifically, that economic criteria have greater influence on evaluations of EU democracy in less affluent countries and that political criteria have a stronger effect in more affluent countries. Economic conditions within each EU member state are measured with data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Worldwide Economic Outlook Database on GDP per capita and unemployment. In both instances, we take

the average of the 12 months prior to the survey in question. To account for the possible effects of the political environment (Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010), we use data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (Kaufmann, et al 2010). The WGI assesses the quality of governance in 215 countries between 1996 and 2014, rating countries along six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. On each dimension, the scores vary between –2.5 and 2.5 with higher scores indicating better-performing political structures.

Results

Following the recent economic and migrant crises, one might easily conclude that both nationalism and economic anxieties are on the rise across Europe. After all, many people are likely to perceive some level of threat to their economic security or the cultural homogeneity of their country. Instead, as has been suggested elsewhere (Fligstein 2016), we find that levels of nationalism and economic anxiety have remained steady or even declined in most European countries. The mean score for our measure of exclusive national identity was much higher in the late 90s and early 00s than over the last six years covered in the ERD³. The highest two scores since 1993 were .49 in 1998 and .5 in 1997. The years 2012-2014 actually register some of the lowest mean scores (between .42 and .43) in the 22-year span of time. This pattern appears to hold up as we break down the analysis by country. Figure 2 presents the mean scores on this measure by country. In some countries, such as Bulgaria, France, Ireland, Italy, and the UK), levels of nationalism has declined. In others, such as Austria, Denmark, Germany,

³ The mean score on the identity measure across all of the years is .45 with .03 standard deviation.

Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden, nationalism has increased. In the remaining countries, the direction is ambiguous.

A similar pattern emerges with the measure of national economic forecast. Generally, the most optimistic forecasts for the economy took place in the 1990s. Again, higher scores on this measure suggest that respondents anticipate that particular economic conditions will be better 12 months after the time of the interview. The highest mean scores of 4.13, 4.09 and 4.08 were in 1999, 1994 and 2000 respectively. The lowest scores of 3.32, 3.34 and 3.37 were recorded in 2008, 2003 and 2009. The most recent years, however, these fall above the mean score for the entire time period.⁴ In 2014, for instance, the mean forecast was 3.95. As shown in Figure 3, the trends in each country largely follow this pattern – publics became a bit more optimistic again after the crisis. Altogether, these patterns suggest that economic perceptions dipped during the height of the global recession (as would be expected), but rebounded over the last few years.

This paper seeks to ascertain whether nationalist sentiments and/or economic anxieties have a stronger effect on members of the public that harbor such thoughts in later years. In other words, does the economy and/or identity-related fears matter more or less for attitudes toward the EU as time moves forward? Our preliminary analyses suggest some surprising results. Figure 4 displays the average bivariate effects of economic forecasts on satisfaction with EU democracy between 1993 and 2014. The EU countries are split into five groups based on the era in which each country joined the EU, a classification that also roughly corresponds with regional location and thus their aggregate economic conditions. The influence of economic

⁴ The mean score for the measure of economic perceptions is 3.67 with .23 standard deviation.

perceptions on EU democracy satisfaction has increased since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in the original EU-6 as well as the 1970s and 1980s enlargement cohorts. However, the economy has mattered as much for performance evaluations of the EU at other points in the history of European integration. In fact, in most of Western Europe, the economy had a more pronounced effect on EU attitudes in 1997 and as strong an effect in 2007 as at any point since the start of the crisis. Eastern Europe diverges from this pattern, with utilitarian concerns assuming much greater importance after the crisis.

Figure 5 documents the relationship between national identity and satisfaction with EU democracy over a similar stretch of time. The downward trend in these graphs suggests that identity matters more for EU attitudes. Some variation exists across the regions. In the 1970s cohort (the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark), the effect of such concerns already increased slightly in the early 2000s. Clearly though, across Europe, the onset of the debt crisis corresponds with increased tendencies for those who identify exclusively with their national community to evaluate the performance of the EU negatively. This result stands out all the more in light of the earlier finding that the percentage of people who identify exclusively with their national community is in decline in many countries. So, while fewer people adopt exclusively nationalist orientations in later years, the strength of those orientations matter far more for political attitudes as time moves forward. Such trends may be especially problematic for the unity of the European project, as decision-makers must cope with a growing block of individuals who are especially motivated by the EU's perceived threat to national culture.

Next, we plot the relationship between utilitarian considerations and EU democracy satisfaction based on models that incorporate a number of demographic control variables.

Given the similarities in the bivariate models between the different regions of Western Europe, we limit the plots for these models to Western and Eastern Europe. Some of the controls are not included in every Eurobarometer survey. As a result, the graphs do not include as many years as the bivariate analyses. As shown in Figure 6, the trend line in the Western Europe graph largely resembles the results of the bivariate analyses, although there is a slightly larger increase in the salience of instrumental considerations after the onset of the debt crisis. Interestingly, the influence of the economy increases dramatically in the East in the first couple years immediately after the crisis, but then declines back to pre-crisis levels over the last few years covered by the surveys. The graphs in Figure 7 are derived from the same models with demographic controls. Here again, these results mimic the earlier bivariate models; the importance of nationalism increases noticeably after the start of the fiscal crisis, in both Western and Eastern Europe.

As a final check, building on these basic models, we conduct two analyses that incorporate both micro and macro-level predictors of democracy satisfaction with the EU⁵ and then use the results to plot the marginal effects of both economic forecasts and exclusive national identity. Figure 8 displays the marginal effects of national economic forecasts. The shorter timeframe – again due to the Eurobarometer not including the same module of questions in every survey – and the addition of several new variables flattens the line prior to the debt crisis. In all likelihood, this is simply because these figures do not include any dates prior to 2003, but the takeaway is that the importance of economic criteria increased quite noticeably in the West in the years after the crisis. In Eastern Europe, as with the earlier figures,

⁵ The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix.

the influence of economic criteria picked up in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, but has already declined to pre-crisis levels. Figure 9 plots the marginal effects of identity based on the more comprehensive model. These graphs confirm the early results – the effects of identity have increased dramatically since the crisis. The primary difference from the earlier figures lies in the mid-00s, where identity appears to have had a stronger role in Western Europe than suggested by the basic model. Overall, however, these analyses confirm the expectations of our second hypothesis. The declining economic environment has served to promote the use of utilitarian considerations when evaluating the EU, but has done even more to elevate the importance of identity-related fears.

Conclusions

This paper tries to answer a simple question: have the standards by which European publics evaluate European integration changed as a result of the most severe economic crisis since the founding of the EU? The answer is affirmative but in unanticipated ways. First, when viewed from 2010 onwards, economic conditions have become more important in nearly all regions of Europe after the economic crisis unfolded. This is unsurprising given the severity of problems, and the difficult policy decisions governments in especially crisis-countries had to make in reducing public outlays. We note, however, that to a surprising degree, economic factors do not become more important when we adopt a longer time series. The strength of relationships hover roughly at the same level in various regions—they are significant (not surprising given the large sample size for each year) but do not reflect a marked rise when compared to their significance in the 1990s. In short, the importance of economic concerns

raised the importance of economic factors in the short run but did not fundamentally alter its long-term importance.

In sharp contrast, we see a significant increase in the importance of national identity as a basis for EU evaluations nearly everywhere. Some of the changes are stark, as in Western Europe where the influence of exclusive national identity often more than doubles in impact. The only exception to this pattern is the CEE region, in large part because national identity has always been important to publics in newer democracies. This is no doubt related to the fact that these countries had achieved independence only in the early 1990s so that the idea of relinquishing sovereignty to the EU did not sit well with publics (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006). The crisis accentuated the relationship in CEE, but did not significantly increase it. In the West, throughout the 90s and 00s, national identity was considerably weaker as a source of EU evaluations, though it never seemed to be completely irrelevant. By 2014, however, national identity has risen in importance in the West to a point where it influences EU evaluations roughly to the same degree as in CEE. Viewed cross-nationally and over time, then, Europe has been thrown back by at least a decade as far as the influence of exclusive national identities on EU evaluations is concerned.

Theoretically, the paper both provides some support for and raises questions about the macro-salience argument. In support of it, we note that the rise of national identity both reflects and drives the debates over nationalism. We obviously cannot speak to the question of how much such nationalism is a reflection of elite debates or how much it drives them. What we can say is that the fiery nationalist overtones that can be observed in the mass media, such as when the Greek media portrays Merkel as Hitler, resonate with voters. This is yet another

sign that right-wing neo-populist parties will continue to find a receptive audience within the electorate. Moreover, when viewed from the perspective of mass publics, electoral opportunities for nationalist appeals have improved substantially since the economic crisis, so that we may now expect these parties to compete successfully for some time to come. This, of course, should be monitored as newer surveys become available—which we intend to do.

This paper raises as many questions as it answers. For one, we would like to know which sub-groups of voters are most likely to exhibit the rise of nationalism. Is the left as likely to rely on exclusive national identities as the right? Initial analyses suggest that we observe the rise across-the board, but a firmer answer must await more analyses than we can present here. Do various social groups rely to an equal degree on national identities? We might hypothesize that, on the grounds that economically insecure individuals may be more receptive to nationalist appeals than those who are better off economically. Again, preliminary analyses suggest that this not the case—we find that national identity increases in relevance across the entire occupational spectrum.

While we clearly need more analyses, the results are worrisome as we find no evidence that national identity is a surrogate for economic self-interests. If this finding stands the test of more analyses, it would suggest that national identity has become a potent force that exhibits all the signs of a clear identity-based factor: all members of a community adopt a similar yardstick against which the EU is judged. If that is the case, the EU may face greater resistance to further integration than many observers sympathetic to the integration project had feared.

Appendix:

The final graphs presented in Figures 8 and 9 are based on a model of EU democracy satisfaction that includes a number of micro and macro-level predictors. The construction of those predictors are described below and that is followed by the analysis itself in Table 1.

EU Democracy Satisfaction: “On the whole, are you very satisfied (5), fairly satisfied (4), not very satisfied (2) or not at all satisfied (1) with the way democracy works in the EU?” The numbers in parentheses indicate the coding for this paper. ‘Don’t know’ responses were coded as 3.

National Economic Expectations and Personal Economic Expectations: The Eurobarometer asks a series of questions about the economy. Each question begins: “What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same when it comes to...” Two prompts focus on the national economy: the economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY) and the employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY). Two prompts focus on the respondent’s personal situation: the financial situation of your household and your personal job situation. The sociotropic measure (national forecast) adds together responses for the national prompts with responses coded as worse (1), the same (2) and better (3). The resulting measure varies between a negative forecast (2) and a positive forecast (6). The same coding is applied to the responses for the personal prompts to develop the egotropic measure.

Exclusiveness of National Identity: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (NATIONALITY) only, (NATIONALITY) and European, European and (NATIONALITY) or European only. This variable was recoded such that (NATIONALITY) only was 1 and all other responses were coded as 0.

Perception of EU Waste: Respondents are asked “what does the EU mean to you personally?” and then provided a series of prompts. Two such prompts include “bureaucracy” and “waste of money”. Every instance in which a respondent mentions one of these prompts is coded as 1 and we then add the total number. The measure varies from 0 to 2.

Salience of Economic Issues: Respondents are asked “what do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?” and then provided a series of prompts. These prompts include “taxation”, “pensions”, “rising prices/inflation”, “unemployment” and the “economic situation”. Every instance in which a respondent mentions one of these prompts is coded as 1 and we then add the total number. The measure varies from 0 up to 5.

Frequency of Political Discussion: “When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently (3), occasionally (2), or never (1) about national political matters?” The numbers in parentheses indicate the coding for this paper.

Education: Respondents are asked “how old were you when you stopped full-time education?” We substituted in the current age for those who replied “still studying”. Those that replied between the ages of 21 and 86 were coded as 1. Those that replied between the ages of 16 and 19 were coded as 2. Those that replied 15 and under were coded as 3.

Left-Right Ideology: “In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale?” Based on this question, we created a number of left/right orientation measures, each of which codes a couple self-placements as 1 and all other responses as 0. Left/Right 1 is for those who identify as a 1 or 2; Left/Right 2 for those who place themselves as 3 or 4; Left/Right 3 is 5

and 6; Left/Right 4 is 7 and 8; Left/Right 5 is 9 and 10; Left/Right Other is for all respondents who could not or would not place themselves on the scale.

Sex: Male (1), Female (0)


Age: “How old are you?” Based on this question, we created a number of age cohort measures, each of which codes individuals of a certain age as 1 and all other individuals as 0. Age 1 is for those 62 years or older. Age 2 is for those between the ages of 42 and 61. Age 3 is for those between the ages of 25 and 41. Age 4 is for those under the age of 25.

Occupational Measures: “What is your current occupation?” Based on this question, we created a number of occupational measures, each of which codes individuals working in a certain field as 1 and all other individuals as 0. Farmer/Fisher is for those who replied “Farmer” or “Fisherman”. Business/Professional is for those who replied “Professional” (such as a lawyer or medical professional), “Owner of a Shop”, “Business Proprietor” or “Employed Professional”. White Collar includes those who replied they were “General Management”, “Middle Management”, “Employed, working at a desk”, “Employed, but travelling (as salesperson)”, “Employed in a service job”, and “Supervisor”. Unemployed includes those who report being responsible for “looking after the home”, “Student” and “Unemployed”. Retired captures those who self-report as retired.

Table 1: Explaining Satisfaction with EU Democracy (basis for Figure 8 and Figure 9)

| | Utilitarian Only | Utilitarian and Identity |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| National Economic Expectations | .09 (.01)** | .09 (.01)** |
| Year*National Econ Expectations | | |
| 1994 | | .03 (.01)* |
| 2004 | .03 (.01)** | |
| 2014 | .04 (.01)** | .03 (.01)** |
| Exclusiveness of National Identity | | -.29 (.03)** |
| Year*Exclusive National Identity | | |
| 1994 | | -.01 (.04) |
| 2014 | | -.25 (.03)** |
| Personal Economic Expectations | .05 (.002)** | .05 (.002)** |
| Perception of EU Waste | -.5 (.02)** | |
| Year*Waste | | |
| 2004 | .1 (.02)** | |
| 2014 | .14 (.02)** | |
| Salience of Economic Issues | .01 (.003)** | |
| Frequency of Political Discussion | .04 (.003)** | |
| Education | -.07 (.003)** | -.002 (.003) |
| Left/Right 1 | -.21 (.01)** | -.2 (.01)** |
| Left/Right 2 | -.02 (.01)* | -.05 (.01)** |
| Left/Right 4 | .1 (.01)** | .04 (.01)** |
| Left/Right 5 | .02 (.01) | .02 (.01) |
| Left/Right Other | -.12 (.01)** | -.03 (.01)** |
| Sex | .03 (.004)** | -.04 (.004)** |
| Age 1 | -.05 (.02)* | -.03 (.02) |
| Age 2 | -.11 (.02)** | -.12 (.02)** |
| Age 3 | -.09 (.02)** | -.09 (.02)** |
| Age 4 | .01 (.02) | -.03 (.02) |
| Farmer/Fisher | .09 (.02)** | .09 (.02)** |
| Business/Professional | .09 (.01)** | .01 (.01) |
| White Collar | .08 (.01)** | .03 (.01)** |
| Unemployed | -.01 (.01) | -.03 (.01)** |
| Retired | -.002 (.01) | -.02 (.01)** |
| Country-Level Variables | | |
| GDP Per Capita | .00002 (.000002)** | .000002 (.000001)* |
| Unemployment | -.03 (.001)** | -.04 (.001)** |
| Procedural Quality | .13 (.04)** | |
| East/West | -.7 (.11)** | -.3 (.08)** |
| Constant | 2.78 (.1)** | 3.4 (.08)** |
| Random Effects Parameters | | |
| National Economic Expectations | .001 (.0003) | .001 (.0003) |
| Random Intercept between Countries | .09 (.03) | .07 (.02) |
| N individual-level observations | 197, 595 | 219,574 |
| N macro-level observations | 27 | 27 |

Figure 1: Mean Scores for EU Democracy Satisfaction by Country




Mean scores of EU democracy satisfaction, where 1 means dissatisfaction and 5 satisfaction.

Figure 2: Mean Scores for National Identity Exclusiveness by Country



Mean scores of exclusive national identity, where 1 means exclusive national identity and 0 includes some element of a European identity.

Figure 3: Mean Scores for National Economic Forecasts by Country





Mean scores of national economic forecasts, where 2 means negative and 6 positive expectations.

Figure 4: Bivariate Relationships between EU Democracy Satisfaction and Economic Perceptions



EU-6

1970s Enlargement




1980s Enlargement

1990s Enlargement



CEEC Enlargement





Based on multilevel analyses, where satisfaction with the EU is the dependent variable and the interaction between national economic forecasts and year constitutes the independent variables.

Figure 5: Bivariate Relationships between EU Democracy Satisfaction and National Identity



EU-6

1970s Enlargement




1980s Enlargement

1990s Enlargement




CEEC Enlargement



Based on multilevel analyses, where satisfaction with the EU is the dependent variable and the interaction between exclusive national identity and year constitutes the independent variables.

Figure 6: EU Democracy Satisfaction with Economic Perceptions and Demographic Controls in Western and Eastern Europe

Western Europe



Eastern Europe






Figure 7: EU Democracy Satisfaction with National Identity Exclusiveness and Demographic Controls in Western and Eastern Europe

Western Europe




Eastern Europe



Based on multilevel analyses, where satisfaction with the EU is the dependent variable and the interaction between national economic forecasts and year (in Figure 6) and between exclusive national identity and year (in Figure 7) constitutes the independent variables along with controls for education, sex, left/right ideology groupings, age cohorts and occupational cohorts.

Figure 8: EU Democracy Satisfaction with Economic Perceptions and Macro-Level Controls in Western and Eastern Europe

Western Europe



Eastern Europe






Figure 9: EU Democracy Satisfaction with National Identity Exclusiveness and Macro-Level Controls in Western and Eastern Europe

Western Europe



Eastern Europe



Based on multilevel analyses, where satisfaction with the EU is the dependent variable and the interaction between national economic forecasts and year (in Figure 8) and between exclusive national identity and year (in Figure 9) constitutes the independent variables along with controls for education, sex, left/right ideology groupings, age cohorts and occupational cohorts, personal economic forecasts, GDP per capita, unemployment, procedural quality, location in Eastern or Western Europe and (depending on the model) issue salience, frequency of political discussion, and perceptions of the EU as wasteful.

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